On the disthomism of Doc Angelic of feserismisnotthomism.wordpress infamy, part I

The immediate reason for the coming about of this humble blog is its owner's desire to publicly refute the unjust and ill-informed allegations made by one "Doc Angelic" on the blog titled "Feserism is not Thomism". The judgement concerning the need to do this is based on at least two considerations: first, the utility of discussing this topic, both speculative and motivational (it is interesting enough to trick myself into finally acting on my long time desire to start a blog); second, the possibility that Doc Angelic's (at least implicit) claim of representing a notable number of Catholics and would-be Thomists might have some truth to it. Given the tragedy that has befallen our civilisation in terms of circulation of sound philosophy and its capacity to secure and sustain the latter's intelligibility for those subjected to it, it is indeed probable that certain misunderstandings of past wisdom do arise. For what it is worth, I can testify to that on the basis of my own experience: it took me years to develop a good enough understanding of Thomism to overcome superficial problems (caused by, to wit, modern assumptions on my part) and render the works of St. Thomas accessible. As, in my view, in modern times access to this wisdom gradually became almost a peculiar privilige of Catholics, to begin with, the rash abandonment by many leaders in the Church of the tradition of philosophy and theology of St. Thomas, also associated with the manuals, in the course of the 20th century couldn't help but exacerbate the problem. It is my conviction that even orthodox, traditional Catholics, though enjoying the many benefits that these qualities inevitably bring, cannot be said to be invulnerable to this. Indeed, the threat of pseudosupernaturalism is rather plausibly greater where a healthy distrust of naturalism and other related errors is constantly confronted by their respective utterances and embodiments that are omnipresent and largely ignored (if not accepted) by Catholic magisterial authorities and intellectuals. Because the environments most of us live in cannot be said to be integrally Catholic, they cannot be expected to inform us properly on their own. I take some of the comments made by Catholics on Dr. Feser's blog in discussion of the posts that drew Angelic's attention to testify to the possibility of this being a reality.

I implore the kind reader to note that I do not subscribe to the truth of the claim made on the aforementioned blog that the objections posted there, in themselves, merit a detailed response. It's just that I try to presume good faith, and grant some truth to the 'empirical' claims made there.

I'm a Roman Catholic convert and an aspiring Thomist philosophiser (if not a philosopher). I credit Dr. Feser's efforts (his own treatments of various topics, but also references and recommendations made by him) with my conversion to Thomism, which preceded my baptism, and, at least indirectly and in part, to Catholicism. I'm personally acquainted with other beneficiaries of his splendid work who would gladly join me in praising him.

Although I'm certain that the defense of some of the Thomist positions thomistically endorsed by Dr. Feser offered here will probably be - at best - suboptimal, I dedicate this effort to Our Lady, the Throne of Wisdom, and St. Thomas, the Angelic Doctor, as well as my (other) patrons in hope of their intercession.

Let us consider Doc Angelic's objections. The first post will deal with his thoughts on the term "(a) personal God". More will follow soon, hopefully, as leisure presents itself.

I. On enthusiasm and presumption

The original version of Doc Angelic's thesis started with a discussion of the import and importance of using the term "(a) personal God" (in the amended version it starts with a discussion of history of Thomism as written about by Dr. Feser, which we will consider later). The author sees fault with Dr. Feser's treatment of the position of Dr. William Craig, in that is goes "against the emphasis which Thomas Aquinas gives to a personal God". According to Doc Angelic, not only is this emphasis (presumably given via the use this term?) prevalent in the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, it apparently enjoys the universal favour of "Catholics, Muslims, Jews etc", which brings them into disagreement with classical theists, understood as people "who dislike the term personal God". Morever, according to Doc Angelic, "the term has been used from earliest times in  the Church in definitions of the Faith and in the liturgy." Because of this Doc Angelic deems that "it’s time for Dr Feser to enthusiastically use the term personal God in the positive light which the Church and St. Thomas always gave to it."

Let's inquire whether the claims made in support of this exhortation are correct. I'd like to start with the grandest of these claims: that the term "(a) personal God" has a long history within Catholicism and prominently features in the acts of the Magisterium and liturgical texts. While considering individual items, I will point out the problems with Angelic's position.


A: The Magisterium

I propose to consult Denzinger-Schoenmetzer's "Enchiridion Symbolorum". The copy I have at hand is that of the XXXVI edition, published by Herder in 1976. I take the book to be a sample material sufficient for our purposes (I have reason to believe that the edition being out of date and thus lacking references to the more recent Magisterial documents will not be a problem for Doc Angelic). In the alphabetic index you can find the following reference: "Persona: Deus personalis B 1bb; -ae divinae B 2; -- humana  C 7bd", the lettered references pointing to the systematic index. The B 1bb reference is obviously of immediate importance, and it relates the following:

B. - DEUS SUBSISTENS UNUS ET TRINUS.

1. Deus unus secundum naturam.
<...>
b. - Attributa divina

<...>
Attributa quescentia. Deus est: <...> 1bb
<...>
- personalis 3542, 3875, 3890, 3973, 3978, 3980; in tribus personis subsistens: v. B 2

B 2 corresponds to at approx. five pages of references covering various questions concerning the Trinity, with approx. 50+ lines per page (with some page references coinciding, as in the rest of the index).

One thing that people familiar with Dz-Schn. will immediatly note is that all the loci mentioning "(Deus ut) personalis" are all relatively recent: 3542 corresponds to the "Iuramentum contra modenismum", the Oath against modernism, issued by St. Pius X in his motu proprio "Sacrorum antistitum" of 1910. The locus reads:

Quinto: certissime teneo ac sincere profiteor, fidem non esse caecum sensum religionis e latebris subconscientiae erumpentem, sub pressione cordis et inflexionis voluntatis moraliter informatae, sed  verum assensum intellectus veritati extrinsice acceptae "ex auditu", quo nempe, quae a Deo personali, creatore ac Domino nostro dicta, testata et revelata sunt, vera esse credimus, propter Dei auctoritatem summe veracis.

The translation, courtesy of the "Papal encyclicals" website:

Fifthly, I hold with certainty and sincerely confess that faith is not a blind sentiment of religion welling up from the depths of the subconscious under the impulse of the heart and the motion of a will trained to morality; but faith is a genuine assent of the intellect to truth received by hearing from an external source. By this assent, because of the authority of the supremely truthful God, we believe to be true that which has been revealed and attested to by a personal God, our creator and lord.

http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius10/p10moath.htm

Why is this confession of God's personality required of people asked to make an oath against the heresy of modernism? Let's consult the encyclical of the saint addressing modernism specifically, Pascendi dominici gregis. What errors concerning God specifically (and knowledge of Him) (remember where Dz.-Schn. places the relevant proposition) are to be found in modernism?

Agnosticism as the foundation of religious philosophy

 <...> According to this teaching human reason is confined entirely within the field of phenomena, that is to say, to things that are perceptible to the senses, and in the manner in which they are perceptible; it has no right and no power to transgress these limits. Hence it is incapable of lifting itself up to God, and of recognising His existence, even by means of visible things. From this it is inferred that God can never be the direct object of science, and that, as regards history, He must not be considered as an historical subject. Given these premises, all will readily perceive what becomes of Natural Theology, of the motives of credibility, of external revelation. The Modernists simply make away with them altogether; they include them in Intellectualism, which they call a ridiculous and long ago defunct system. <...>

Vital immanence

 <...> But we have not yet come to the end of their philosophy, or, to speak more accurately, their folly. For Modernism finds in this sentiment not faith only, but with and in faith, as they understand it, revelation, they say, abides. For what more can one require for revelation? Is not that religious sentiment which is perceptible in the consciousness revelation, or at least the beginning of revelation? Nay, is not God Himself, as He manifests Himself to the soul, indistinctly it is true, in this same religious sense, revelation? And they add: Since God is both the object and the cause of faith, this revelation is at the same time of God and from God; that is, God is both the revealer and the revealed.  <...>

And then, as the saint explores the logic of the modernist position,

 <...> And thus, Venerable Brethren, the road is open for us to study the Modernists in the theological arena - a difficult task, yet one that may be disposed of briefly. The end to be attained is the conciliation of faith with science, always, however, saving the primacy of science over faith. In this branch the Modernist theologian avails himself of exactly the same principles which we have seen employed by the Modernist philosopher, and applies them to the believer: the principles of immanence and symbolism. The process is an extremely simple one. The philosopher has declared: The principle of faith is immanent; the believer has added: This principle is God; and the theologian draws the conclusion: God is immanent in man. Thus we have theological immanence. So too, the philosopher regards as certain that the representations of the object of faith are merely symbolical; the believer has affirmed that the object of faith is God in Himself; and the theologian proceeds to affirm that: The representations of the divine reality are symbolical. And thus we have theological symbolism.  <...>

Concluding his treatment of the nature of modenism, the saint writes:

The vast majority of mankind holds and always will hold firmly that sentiment and experience alone, when not enlightened and guided by reason, do not lead to the knowledge of God. What remains, then, but the annihilation of all religion, - atheism? Certainly it is not the doctrine of symbolism - will save us from this. For if all the intellectual elements, as they call them, of religion are pure symbols, will not the very name of God or of divine personality be also a symbol, and if this be admitted will not the personality of God become a matter of doubt and the way opened to Pantheism? And to Pantheism that other doctrine of the divine immanence leads directly. For does it, We ask, leave God distinct from man or not? If yes, in what does it differ from Catholic doctrine, and why reject external revelation? If no, we are at once in Pantheism. Now the doctrine of immanence in the Modernist acceptation holds and professes that every phenomenon of conscience proceeds from man as man. The rigorous conclusion from this is the identity of man with God, which means Pantheism. The same conclusion follows from the distinction Modernists make between science and faith. The object of science they say is the reality of the knowable; the object of faith, on the contrary, is the reality of the unknowable. Now what makes the unknowable unknowable is its disproportion with the intelligible - a disproportion which nothing whatever, even in the doctrine of the Modernist, can suppress. Hence the unknowable remains and will eternally remain unknowable to the believer as well as to the man of science. Therefore if any religion at all is possible it can only be the religion of an unknowable reality. And why this religion might not be that universal soul of the universe, of which a rationalist speaks, is something We do see. Certainly this suffices to show superabundantly by how many roads Modernism leads to the annihilation of all religion. The first step in this direction was taken by Protestantism; the second is made by Modernism; the next will plunge headlong into atheism.

The mention of Divine personality (not identical with "(a) personal God") is made in opposition to pantheism or atheism. This is not precisely the same debate as that to which Doc Angelic refers in his opening:
"We live in an age where the main anti-religious tendency is the denial of a  personal God, which comes about for all sorts of reasons – but the  result is immediate: God is reduced to some kind of ”force”, good of course, why not – but something that has  almost no effect on the way people behave. It is the death of religion." 

We will return to consider this later, but I urge the kind reader to note that pantheism is not equivalent to the reduction of God to "some kind of good force that has almost no effect on the way people behave", nor is modernism as condemned by St. Pius X. The context of the encyclical is not too general in scope, so, at least without futher argument, it cannot reasonably viewed as mandating the "enthusiastic" general use of the term.

Let's consider the other loci.

The next (3875) corresponds to Humani generis of Pius XII (1949). The pope writes:

It is not surprising that such discord and error should always have existed outside the fold of Christ. For though, absolutely speaking, human reason by its own natural force and light can arrive at a true and certain knowledge of the one personal God, Who by His providence watches over and governs the world, and also of the natural law, which the Creator has written in our hearts, still there are not a few obstacles to prevent reason from making efficient and fruitful use of its natural ability. The truths that have to do with God and the relations between God and men, completely surpass the sensible order and demand self-surrender and self-abnegation in order to be put into practice and to influence practical life. Now the human intellect, in gaining the knowledge of such truths is hampered both by the activity of the senses and the imagination, and by evil passions arising from original sin. Hence men easily persuade themselves in such matters that what they do not wish to believe is false or at least doubtful.

Here the pope explicitly and unambiguously teaches that God -as- knowable and known through natural theology is personal and provident. Catholic natural theology par excellence just is Thomistic natural theology, with the Five Ways (along with derivations concerning individual attributes) lauded as the crowning achievement. I ask the reader to keep this in mind when we turn to consider the opposition Doc Angelic seems to set up between the God of natural theology and that of Revelation when it comes to personality.

Interestingly, in the index of Denz. the following note can be found under DEUS SE RELEVANS b. Aptitudo ad cognoscendum veritates religiosas: 1bb Essentia Dei secundum aliqua attributa potest cognosci iam sola ratione humana <...>; inter quae Dei personalitas <..>

The next locus is in the same document. The pope writes:

It is not surprising that novelties of this kind have already borne their deadly fruit in almost all branches of theology. It is now doubted that human reason, without divine revelation and the help of divine grace, can, by arguments drawn from the created universe, prove the existence of a personal God; it is denied that the world had a beginning; it is argued that the creation of the world is necessary, since it proceeds from the necessary liberality of divine love; it is denied that God has eternal and infallible foreknowledge of the free actions of men - all this in contradiction to the decrees of the Vatican Council.

The truth that God as demonstrated in natural theology is personal is presupposed; indeed, denial of this is considered to be of the deadly fruits of theological novelties condemned.

Proceeding to 3978 and 3980, we find the encyclical Pacem in terris. The term "personal God" is used there more than once:

<...> When society is formed on a basis of rights and duties, men have an immediate grasp of spiritual and intellectual values, and have no difficulty in understanding what is meant by truth, justice, charity and freedom. They become, moreover, conscious of being members of such a society. And that is not all. Inspired by such principles, they attain to a better knowledge of the true God—a personal God transcending human nature. They recognize that their relationship with God forms the very foundation of their life—the interior life of the spirit, and the life which they live in the society of their fellows. <...>

<...> Hence, to quote Pope Pius XII, "The absolute order of living beings, and the very purpose of man—an autonomous being, the subject of duties and inviolable rights, and the origin and purpose of human society—have a direct bearing upon the State as a necessary community endowed with authority. Divest it of this authority, and it is nothing, it is lifeless.... But right reason, and above all Christian faith, make it clear that such an order can have no other origin but in God, a personal God, our Creator. Hence it is from Him that State officials derive their dignity, for they share to some extent in the authority of God Himself." <...> 

The quote above comes from Pius XII's broadcast message, Christmas 1944 (AAS 37 (1945) 15).

I'd like to note that the encyclical is, in my estimation, mostly of "natural-legal" nature.

So, summing up, the six loci mentioned in Dz.-Sch. of 1976 concern three documents (four if you count the text of the broadcast) written by three pontiffs, all in the 20th century. At least some of these proclaim the personal nature of the "God of Athens" (and hence hardly help Angelic's argument). It is true that the index doesn't mention all the instances of this term contained within the book. It is possible, of course, that the editor missed or concealed all the evidence of early and constant enthusiastic use. I see no reason to think so, however, as Dz.-Schn. is a standard reference book, and this particular copy was obtained in a traditional seminary where it is also used. It's probably worth mentioning at this point that Doc Angelic provides no evidence to back up the assertion with which we are now concerned. He is, naturally, welcome to attempt to do that.

Given that St. Thomas accepts the classic definition of a person given by Boethius (translated as "a person is an individual substance of a rational nature") I ask the gentle reader to contrast this with other attributes, which are of obvious import, such as:

1bc Attributa operativa

Vita intellectiva: Deus est (infinite) sapiens: 2901 3001 3004 3009 3781; omniscius 164 169 3009 3646
In specie: habet scientiam cordium et secretorum 670 2866; praescit (scientia visionis) futura libera creatrarum (333 419) 621 625-629 646 685 3003 a3646 3890; haec ergo habent determinatam veritatem 1391-1395; Deus non potest falli 3008

Vita volitiva: Deus est - : voluntate infinitus 3001;
- : liber a necessitate 526, 3890;
- : voluntate rationabili, non praeveniente sapientiam 526;
- : iustus 285 621 1546 1549 1672 2216 3781;
- : bonus et misericors erga homines 62 236 248 309 1534 1548s 1562 1576 1668 1696;
- : verax: non potest fallere 3008; Deus est fons omnis veritatis 2811;
- : omnipotens (referendo solum locos praestantiores de Deo qua uno:) 680 683 685 800 851 1330 1880 3001 <...> voluntati Dei nihil resistere potest 647; reprob. asserta restingentia potentiam Dei 410 721 726s
Vita affectiva: Deus est (in et ex se) beatus 415 441s a3001
Deus est impassibilis seu inviolabilis 16 116 a196s 297 a300 318 358 a359 a 367 594 635s 681 801 852 2529 <...>

Please note both the frequency and the antiquity of the loci.

Ending our treatment of the Magisterial evidence for now, I would like to draw the reader's special attention to what I consider to be a powerful argument from silence: in the dogmatic constitution Dei Filius of Vatican I, one the most important dogmatic decisions concerning natural theology and related matters, the term in question is not used, not even once. On a side note, the first canon on revelation clearly teaches that God as known through reason is not only Creator but Lord (the latter term, apart from anything else, being of one of  the most popular scriptural references to Divinity; it also connotes subjection to His rule and Providence).

B: The liturgy.

Let's us consider liturgical texts, beginning with the Missal of 1962.

A search of its text (available here; Control-F search command; "person" query) yields 15 results, all of which concern: a) the Persons of the Blessed Trinity; b) ecclesiastics.

Pretty much the same goes for Pontificale Romanum (available here; the same query): 33 results, all of which concern: a) the Persons of the Blessed Trinity; b) human persons, chiefly ecclesiastics.

The same search done with the Diurnale (available here) yields 15 items, and, again, these concern: a) the Persons of the Blessed Trinity; b) human persons (or the word "personent"). I failed to find the full Roman Breviary in pdf-format with the search function enabled, but given reason I can theoretically look through my physical books to locate the term being used. For what it is worth, I happen to use them, and cannot for the life of me recall being confronted with prominent use of the term "(a) personal God" there. I would be grateful to anyone willing and able to conduct the search.

The only items procured through same search done with the Roman Ritual (available here) that are even remotely relevant are, apart from the above cited Oath against modernism, a) a reference to God's personal love toward the dying;  individual b) concern the person of Christ, all the other instances having to do with, again, the Persons of the Blessed Trinity; b) human persons (and priest acting "in persona Christi"; due to technical inconvenience involved, I'm less confident in this search: I had to open individual parts in a browser window).

I'm prepared to consider looking through liturgical books of other traditional Catholic liturgies out of curiosity. I've had the joy of assisting at numerous Byzantine-rite Divine Liturgies and am unaware of any instance of the use of the term in question (or its equivalent). The Study Liturgicon of Ruthenians available online doesn't mention it, nor does the Muscovite "ordinary" (available here (in Russian).
However, I think its safe to say that such pursuits would be of a more academic nature: surely the fact that the texts of the liturgies of traditional Roman rite do not support the assertion made by Doc Angelic is enough to falsify it (presuming agreement in emphasis across Rites), for our purposes, at least.

C. St. Thomas and other sources

If by now the gentle reader is tempted to deny favourable presumptions to bold assertions without specific references on the part of Doc Angelic, I cannot blame them. It would seem that it is incumbent upon him to "to provide quotes and links <...> to the Summa", which, he assures us, "can be done many times over", for apart from the question alluded to in the comment (the context of which is, unsurprisingly, that of triadology), as far as I can tell, the use of the term "(a) personal God" is not at all frequent.

If we, keeping in mind the definition of "person" St. Thomas is working with, turn to questions immediately relevant to it (concerning rational nature), the falsity of the claim will become clear.
For example, in the entire treatise on the One God (questions 1-26, links: q. 1, q. 2, qq. 3-14, qq.  15-27) there's not a single instance of relevant use (the term "persona" (and cognates, naturally) is only used 1) in discussions of triadology; 2) to refer to the person of Christ; 3) honouring grammar, e.g. "praeterea, Ierem. XVIII, ex persona domini dicitur"); 4) to refer to people. Incidentally, the only (indexed, at least; I don't recall spotting other occurences, though) instance of the use of a cognate in Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's O.P. eponymous commentary occurs in an appendix ("ON GOD'S PERSONALITY IN OPPOSITION TO PANTHEISM"), in which the venerable friar attacks, referencing Vat. I, pantheists and monists (particularly qua teaching that "the notion of person implies limitation). The text can be of some interest to us:

"<...> This error is refuted from the principles already established. We must bear in mind that a person is an intelligent and free subject.
But the teaching authority of the Church enunciates in the Vatican Council what is the foundation for this refutation, by attributing to God what formally constitutes person, namely, subsistence, intelligence, free will, and also real and essential distinction from the world; <...>

Please note, again, 1) the context of condemning pantheism; 2) the definitive list of personal attributes.

Using the text available here, I conducted the search through the entire Summa contra Gentiles, with the same predictable result: not once is the term employed by St. Thomas in this polemical work against the infidels (all the hits fitting the usual categories, 1)-4).

I also submit, as a point of reference, a link to A lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas based on the Summa ... pt.1-5 1948-1949. Deferrari, Roy; see pp. 831-832, which also does not indicate "enthuastic use" of the term in question by St. Thomas.

If we turn to less "academic" works by Aquinas, for example, the collection of summaries of  sermons (esp. relevant given the special vocation of his religious order) by the saint, made by Reginald of Piperno (published as "The Aquinas Catechism"), we will not find instances of such use.
Speaking of catechisms, that of St. Pius X yields the by now usual result. The same goes for both the Roman (Latin; to be fair, there's a mention of "one person" (unam personam; of the Father, after a discussion of God being called Father), but again, in triadological context) and Penny Catechisms.
If we turn to an another work of St. Thomas designed to treat essentials, the Compendium of theology, we will find specific treatment of issues that divide classical theists and theistic personalists, such as divine simplicity or immutability, or God standing outside the generic order, as well as matters like divine intelligence or volition. What we will not find are comparable (if any) discussion of "divine personality". Now, obviously, the matter is treated in the questions referenced immediately above; God is a "substantial" and rational reality; however, if perhaps unbeknownst to him, Doc seems to have something additional in mind, as his discussion of Adam implies. We will have the occasion to return to this question later.

_ _ _

So, as far as I can tell, the two sources behind the exhortation specified by Angelic do not in fact support it. Nor should this be news to people familiar with the sources.

Precisely why Doc thinks that his uncorroborated assertions deserve to be taken seriously, I know not: again, the claims are reinforced not by specific references, but rather repetition. Here's an example: in one of his more recent raids on Dr. Feser's blog Doc not only repeated his point about vicious "discomfort" and "lack of enthuasiasm", but claimed that the respective abscence "is a declaration in itself". He added that these constitute "abandonment" of "this age-old Catholic terminology". Now, I'm not a native English speaker, so it is enitirely possible that I'm missing something here, but "age-old" seems to mean something different from "a century old", the latter being a fair assessment. "A century old", however, doesn't seem to have the gravity necessary to back up Doc's charge, nor is this compensated by any actual favour worth mentioning that this term can be said to enjoy in Catholic theology. This grand claim didn't fail to elicit bafflement (repeated, in my case), or at least surprise: the user Jose Apolinar urged Doc to corroborate it. Predictably, an actual attempt to do that is yet to take place. I hope by now the reader has a fairly good idea of precisely how tall this order is.

_ _ _

We will now turn to addressing some of the other assertions made on the unfortunately named blog.

"We live in an age where the main anti-religious tendency is the denial of a  personal God, which comes about for all sorts of reasons – but the  result is immediate: God is reduced to some kind of ”force”, good of course, why not – but something that has  almost no effect on the way people behave. It is the death of religionHowever it now seems that the Church and the world is besieged by ”theistic personalism”. 

I should first note that I do not know whether the initial identification of the main anti-religious tendency is correct. Let's grant the truth of it, at least for the sake of argument. One should, however, ask exactly what is meant by "religion" here. Suppose it's used more or less in the "summaic" sense of a virtue.  As any attentive reader of the Summa will know, one can usually sin against some virtue by both excess and deficiency.

It's probable that the word is used in a more general sense describing, say, a kind (way?) of life (both speculative and practical) determined by considerations of the divine/transcendent etc.

Whatever sense is employed here, however, theistic personalism is a problem. If we take the first meaning, one can make the argument that theistic personalism is idolatry, in that the relevant conception of God is deficient in its denial of divine simplicity, -the- doctrinal difference between classical theists and personalists, at least in Dr. Feser's understanding:

But it is not only atheists who take such a view. Davies contrasts classical theism with what he calls “theistic personalism” and what the Christian apologist Norman Geisler calls “neo-theism.” The theistic personalist or neo-theist conceives of God essentially as a person comparable to human persons, only without the limitations we have. The idea is to begin with what we know about human beings and then to abstract away first the body, then our temporal limitations, then our epistemological and volitional confinement to knowing about and having control over only a particular point of space and time, then our moral defects, and to keep going until we arrive at the notion of a being who has power, knowledge, and goodness like ours but to an unlimited degree. Theistic personalism or neo-theism also rejects divine simplicity and its implications; indeed, this is the motivation for developing a conception of God by abstracting from our conception of human persons, for the theistic personalist objects to the notion of God as immutable, impassible, and eternal – finding it too cold and otherworldly, and incompatible with a literal reading of various biblical passages – and typically has philosophical objections to the notion of divine simplicity. Davies identifies Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne as theistic personalists. 

Or, to quote a post that especially suggests itself as worthwhile reading given the time of the liturgical year we're in:

Theistic personalists are, as I have said, explicitly or implicitly committed to regarding God as an instance of a kind.  Their core thesis, to the effect that God is “a person without a body” (Swinburne) or that “there is such a person as God” (Plantinga), seems to give us something like the following picture: There’s the genus person and under it the two species embodied persons and disembodied persons.  Disembodied persons is, in turn, a genus relative to the species disembodied souls, angelic persons, and divine persons.  And it’s in the latter class, it seems, that you’ll find God.  

Given that such a conception of God is clearly idolatrious (for a follower of Aquinas, at least, who vigorously defends the doctrine and draws various conclusions of paramount importance from it), it's a religion-killing agent quite comparable to therapeutic deism or vague pantheism.

As an orthodox Catholic, surely the only religion Doc wants to preserve from dying is Catholicism.
Now, the Church solemnly teaches this doctrine, as Dr. Feser had repeatedly noted.

The IV Lateran Council in its definition against the Cathars proclaims:

We firmly believe and simply confess that there is only one true God, eternal and immeasurable, almighty, unchangeable, incomprehensible and ineffable, Father, Son and holy Spirit, three persons but one absolutely simple essence, substance or nature {1}. The Father is from none, the Son from the Father alone, and the holy Spirit from both equally, eternally without beginning or end; the Father generating, the Son being born, and the holy Spirit proceeding; consubstantial and coequal, co-omnipotent and coeternal; one principle of all things, creator of all things invisible and visible, spiritual and corporeal; who by his almighty power at the beginning of time created from nothing both spiritual and corporeal creatures, that is to say angelic and earthly, and then created human beings composed as it were of both spirit and body in common. The devil and other demons were created by God naturally good, but they became evil by their own doing. Man, however, sinned at the prompting of the devil.

And the I Vatican in Dei Filius:

The holy, Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one, true, living God, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, omnipotent, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intellect and will, and in every perfection; who, although He is one, singular, altogether simple and unchangeable spiritual substance, must be proclaimed distinct in reality and essence from the world; most blessed in Himself and of Himself, and ineffably most high above all things which are or can be conceived outside Himself.

Now, Doc generously allows Thomists to "engage in debates that may not have been news when St. Thomas was alive" (though it would seem that deniers of divine simplicity were around at the time of St. Thomas' earthly life, which the Lateran definition highlights). So perhaps he would be prepared to grant that Dr. Feser's fighting the good fight against the personalists (with their heretical views on divine simplicity), especially given the fact that the posts by Dr. Feser do not in fact make it seem, to those of us lacking preternatural powers, at least, that, according to Dr. Feser, personalists are "besieging the Church and the world", at least not to the extent that a "war without end" would be called for (neither does Dr. Feser conscript anybody by making such appeals).

It is sad that Doc's seeming clairvoyance emboldens him to read people's minds (an impression produced at least partially due to the lack of specific argument), but does not grant enough insight to realise that the fact that terminology is recent doesn't make it "misleading". Nor is it enough to ensure homework being done on the objects of his attacks.

I lament this especially in light of what follows this feat of generosity. Doc makes a truly bewildering statement: but presumably they should do so using his ideas and not contradicting them.

What, pray tell, is the contradiction? Even if we were to grant that the term "(a) personal God" should be enthusiastically used, how is failure to do so a contradiction? 
I submit that this odd claim is the reason why it is easy to "misread" this attack as a charge of denying God's personality. The charge of "contradiction" only really makes sense on such a hypothesis. So this reading of Doc's post actually recommends itself to a charitable reader trying to make sense of his blog.

It was unpleasant to see the use of the ”God is not a (one)person because there are three persons in the Trinity” argument. Yes of course, but how does the Trinity diminish personality? 

It really doesn't, I concede. But so does Dr. Feser. Quoting Brian Davies again on this:

As Brian Davies points out in The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, one of the most remarkable things to note about this sort of claim is how foreign it is to what has historically been regarded as Christian orthodoxy:

'The formula ‘God is a person’ is (given the history of theistic thinking and writing) a relatively recent one. I believe that its first occurrence in English comes in the report of a trial of someone called John Biddle (b. 1615), who in 1644 was brought before the magistrates of Gloucester, England, on a charge of heresy. His ‘heresy’ was claiming that God is a person. Biddle was explicitly defending Unitarian beliefs about God, already in evidence among Socinians outside England.

In other words, Biddle’s ‘God is a person’ was intended as a rejection of the orthodox Christian claim that God is three persons in one substance (the doctrine of the Trinity). One can hardly take it to be a traditional Christian answer to the question ‘What is God?’ According to the doctrine of the Trinity, God is certainly not three persons in one person. And when orthodox exponents of the doctrine speak of Father, Son, and Spirit as ‘persons,’ they certainly do not take ‘person’ to mean what it seems to mean for [Richard] Swinburne and those who agree with him. They do not, for example, think of the persons of the Trinity as distinct centres of consciousness, or as three members of a kind. (pp. 59-60)'

The point of bringing up the Trinity, of course, is that the statement "God is a person", made without necessary qualifications and understood quasi-definitionally, makes (or at least can, in a serious sense) the standard presentation of this central Catholic dogma an absurd mess.

 It goes against the emphasis which Thomas Aquinas gives to a personal God, affirming that not only is He personal, but the perfection of personality. It isn’t necessary to provide quotes and links here to the Summa but it can be done many times over. St. Thomas never limited himself to the God that Aristotle had been able to sense, who of course was famously lacking in personality. He always defended the God of revelation, the God of Abraham, God as He showed Himself to be.

I already addressed most of the assertions made in this bit, but I think it is worthwhile to note that the opposition between the God of natural theology and revelation's God is not present in Aquinas, at least Doc cites nothing to support this allegation of his. Indeed, given that knowability of the rationality of divine nature is standard Catholic teaching (as should be clear at this point), arguing against this not only places one at odds with Catholicism, but does the same to Aquinas, if he is appealed to. The teaching itself evidently goes back to the Apostle. In his Epistle to the Romans we read:

Because that which is known of God is manifest in them. For God hath manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity: so that they are inexcusable.

Because that, when they knew God, they have not glorified him as God, or given thanks; but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. For professing themselves to be wise, they became fools. And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of fourfooted beasts, and of creeping things

Now, the clear meaning of this is that the One True God manifested Himself to the pagans in creation, and this knowability includes, of course, His rational nature. It would make no sense, for example, to berate the Gentiles for ingratitude towards something that was not rational (and hence not personal). Nor can someone be said to "know God" if what is meant doesn't cover knowledge of God's substantiality (that is, the real difference between Him and the world) and rationality (at least, so it would seem, given the point St. Paul's making).

Let's consider a general characterisation of Gentile natural theology by Aquinas (after establishing). The saint writes:

The truths about God thus far proposed have been subtly discussed by a number of pagan philosophers, although some of them erred concerning these matters. And those who propounded true doctrine in this respect were scarcely able to arrive at such truths even after long and painstaking investigation. But there are other truths about God revealed to us in the teaching of the Christian religion, which were beyond the reach of the philosopher. These are truths about which we are instructed, in accord with the norm of Christian faith, in a way that transcends human perception. The teaching is this: although God is one and simple, as has been explained, God is Father, God is Son, and God is Holy Spirit. And these three are not three gods, but are one God. We now turn to a consideration of this truth, so far as is possible to us.

It would seem that Aristotle is cited by Doc as the Gentile natural theologian par excellence and a stand-in for natural theology. If the Stagirite is that, however, he clearly achieved knowledge of God's substantiality and rationality, that is, His personality (and if he's not, Aristotle is irrelevant here). On somewhat of a side note, there's positive reason to believe that he did (as St. Thomas seems to agree; does he, too, refuse point-blanc to note the deficiencies and to manifest his Thomistic emphasis?):

On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.

Life? Check. Rationality, contemplation and pleasure? Check. What is impersonal about
this?

Anyway, one wonders: how can the knowledge that natural theology terminates in be part of the preambulae fidei if it does not include knowing Divinity as something capable of special revelation? The Church's clear answer to the question is that it can't.

Perhaps the "impersonality" Doc alludes to is a relative one. It is, however, at least very hard (nay, impossible) to make sense of this supposition. How does one measure something like that?

That attaining such knowledge is difficult is irrelevant to the question at hand. Of course certain revealed truths (such as non-eternity of the world) do a great deal to aid us in learning and avoiding error: the visible world's beginning in time helps see the truth of what creation is rather clearer; promulgation of the Commandments in speech leaves not too much room for doubting God's rationality or Providence. But God is no more essentially a speaker or a law-giver than He is creator. The modes in question (we do not treat of grace here) do not and cannot communicate essentially different accounts of divine nature in terms of substantiality and rationality.
All true knowledge on our part, however obtained, is a sort of perfection. And the credit for all these is, of course, God's. His personality is evident in both providently leading persons to reach the correct conclusions and, say, addressing Abraham in speech (though in the latter case it is more immediately apparent to us).

My hope is that by now it's clear that although Doc's stated concern is noble, it is misplaced and misguided, at least partially. As soon as time allows, I hope to address the other points made on his blog.
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Here's some food for thought, as well as a "teaser" for the parts to follow:

You might compare the situation to that of a landowner who has sold an unimproved parcel of land to a certain family – which, just to be cute, we’ll call the Adams family.  In allowing the Adamses to take possession of the parcel, he’s given them everything he owed them.  But suppose he offers to throw in, for free, something extra – to plant on the land a vineyard using the finest quality vines, whose fruit will make possible the best wine.  This is something that all the descendents of the original Adamses who bought the land will profit from.  But the landowner makes the offer only conditionally.  He wants to see how Mr. and Mrs. Adams are going to handle things before turning the vineyard over to the Adams family as a whole, including the many descendents who are not likely to do any better with the vines than their ancestors are.  So if Mr. and Mrs. Adams do well with the first vines planted, they and their descendents will get to keep them and reap the benefits.  If not, the landowner will tear them out and leave the Adamses and their descendents with only the original unimproved parcel, which is all they were owed in the first place. 

Modern biology and original sin, Part II, Edward Feser
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The analogy in the post about the vineyard is so far from what St. Thomas has to say on the subject.

Feserism is not Thomism, Doc Angelic
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CHAPTER 195

TRANSMISSION OF THESE EVILS TO POSTERITY

The blessing of original justice was conferred by God on the human race in the person of its first parent, in such a way that it was to be transmitted to his posterity through him. But when a cause is removed, the effect cannot follow. Therefore, when the first man stripped himself of this good by his sin, all his descendants were likewise deprived of it. And so for all time, that is, ever since the sin of the first parent, all men come into the world bereft of original justice and burdened with the defects that attend its loss.

This is in no way against the order of justice, as though God were punishing the sons for the crime of their first father. For the punishment in question is no more than the withdrawing of goods that were supernaturally granted by God to the first man for transmission, through him, to others. These others had no right to such goods, except so far as the gifts were to be passed on to them through their first parent. In the same way a king may reward a soldier with the grant of an estate, which is to be handed on by him to his heirs. If the soldier then commits a crime against the king, and so is adjudged to forfeit the estate, it cannot afterwards pass to his heirs. In this case the sons are justly dispossessed in consequence of their father’s crime.

Compendium of theology, St. Thomas Aquinas.